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Understanding geography through thick and thin: Mixed 1 
qualitative-simulation methods 2 
 3 
Abstract  4 
Across geography there has been variable engagement with the use of simulation and agent-5 
based modelling. We argue here that agent-based simulation provides a complementary method 6 
to investigate geographical issues which need not be used in ways that are epistemologically 7 
different in kind from some other approaches in contemporary geography. We discuss how the 8 
heuristic and dialogic uses of agent-based simulation models might foster greater engagement 9 
beyond the areas of human geography in which it has been adopted. In particular, we propose 10 
mixed qualitative-simulation methods that iterate back-and-forth between ‘thick’ (qualitative) 11 
and ‘thin’ (simulation) approaches and between the theory and data they produce or suggest. 12 
These mixed methods are based on the notion of simulation modelling as process and practice; 13 
a way of using computers with concepts and data to ensure social theory remains embedded in 14 
day-to-day geographical thinking. 15 
 16 
Keywords: agent-based; simulation; modelling; mixed methods; explanation; agent-based 17 
model  18 
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"It is important to change perspectives so that different methods are seen to be complementary, 19 
emphasising the additive rather than divisive attributes of quantitative methods, qualitative 20 
methods and visualisation (mainly GIS and cartography). For example, modelling and 21 
simulation would benefit by incorporating behavioural rules, values, norms and perceptions in 22 
models. Agent-based modelling provides a point of departure." (ESRC, 2013: 16)  23 
  24 
Introduction 25 
Identifying appropriate methods and tools has long been a central challenge for understanding 26 
and representing geography. Whereas in some sub-disciplines and countries, technical and 27 
quantitative methods have been embraced (such as in the US), in others qualitative and 28 
quantitative approaches have become divorced (such as in the UK). For example, a recent 29 
benchmarking report applauded human geography in the UK for being conceptually innovative 30 
and diverse, but at the same time noted low rates of use and training in quantitative and 31 
technical methods and tools (ESRC, 2013). That same report went on to argue that to counter a 32 
growing methodological divide between human and physical geography, the additive attributes 33 
of multiple methods (qualitative, quantitative, visualization) should be emphasised so that they 34 
are seen as complementary, including the use of modelling and simulation (see quote above). 35 
The potential value of these newer approaches may not be immediately apparent for those 36 
whose initial encounters have been couched in terms of technical possibilities or which seem to 37 
lack a complementary perspective or epistemology to their own. Consequently, here we 38 
examine how one approach in geography that uses currently available computer-simulation 39 
methods can play a number of epistemic rôles similar to many epistemic frameworks in 40 
common use elsewhere in the discipline. This approach is a form of computer simulation 41 
known as agent-based modelling, the tools of which are known as agent-based models (ABM).  42 
It is important to highlight that our concern here is not specifically with ‘models’ but 43 
about representation, understanding and practice in geography. If contemporary forms of 44 
modelling and simulation are to be useful (and used) for understanding and representing 45 
geography, it is important that we recognize how they can be used in ways that are 46 
complementary to existing interpretative, heuristic and dialogic approaches. Looking to the 47 
future in the late 1980s, Macmillan (1989: 310) suggested that if a conference on models in 48 
geography were to be held in 2007: “there can be little doubt that the subjects under discussion 49 
will be computer models, although the adjective will be regarded as superfluous”. Here, in the 50 
future, part of our argument is that far from being superfluous, it is important that we 51 
distinguish between our theories and conceptual models on the one hand and the tools used to 52 
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implement, investigate and explore them on the other. For example, in computer-simulation 53 
modelling, a conceptualization of some target phenomenon (i.e. a conceptual model) is 54 
specified in code (i.e. as a formal model) that can be iteratively executed by a computer (i.e. 55 
simulated) to produce output that can be examined to understand the logical consequences of 56 
the conceptualization. Although conceptual model (generated in our minds) and formal model 57 
(computer code) might be conflated as ‘computer model’, their distinction is key for identifying 58 
rôles computer-simulation modelling can play in understanding (at least some) geographical 59 
questions. Distinguishing conceptual and formal models in this way highlights the important 60 
distinction between simulations in the computer and what modellers learn through the process 61 
and practice of modelling. Understanding comes from elucidating the fundamental qualitative 62 
features of the target phenomena, identifying which computer outputs are artefacts of the 63 
simulation and which are a trustworthy representation, thereby enabling creation, development 64 
and evaluation of theory, identification of new data needs and improvements in understanding 65 
as the practice of modelling proceeds.  66 
We argue here that agent-based simulation provides a complementary method to 67 
investigate geographical issues but which need not be used and understood in ways that are 68 
epistemologically different in kind from some other approaches in contemporary geography. 69 
However, a review of the literature shows that in geography (as defined by ISI Web of 70 
Knowledge Journal Citation Reports) papers discussing agent-based simulation approaches are 71 
concentrated in a few technically orientated and North American journals (Figure 1), with more 72 
than 50% of papers in only three journals (International Journal of Geographical Information 73 
Science, Computers Environment and Urban Systems, and Annals of the Association of 74 
American Geographers). To consider how and why simulation might become more widely used 75 
across (human1) geography we discuss its heuristic and dialogic attributes and suggest greatest 76 
additive benefits will come from mixed methods that combine both qualitative and simulation 77 
approaches.  78 
 79 
Representations of Geography 80 
Agent-based simulation is one computer-simulation framework some geographers have 81 
used to explore the intermediate complexity of the world (Bithell et al., 2008). The agent-based 82 
framework can flexibly represent (our conceptual models of) multiple, discrete, multi-faceted, 83 
                                                             
1 Our discussion here is primarily with human geographers but many of our broader points are also relevant to 
physical geographers (and see Wainwright and Millington 2010 for a discussion with physical geographers). 
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heterogeneous actors (human or otherwise) and their relationships and interactions between one 84 
another and their environment, through time and space. At their most basic, an agent in this 85 
simulation framework is an individuated object with unique defined attributes (e.g. location, 86 
age, wealth, political leaning, aspirations for children) capable of executing context-dependent 87 
functions that may change the attributes of themselves and others (e.g. move house or not 88 
depending on whether you like your current neighbourhood, chop down a tree or not depending 89 
on whether you need fuelwood, get married or stay single depending on your preference or 90 
social circumstances). Thus, the properties of these simulation frameworks permit us to 91 
represent the world as being constituted by autonomous individuated objects with causal 92 
powers that may (or may not) be activated depending on the particular circumstances of the 93 
object. In this way, these objects, known as ‘agents’, can be thought of providing a means to 94 
represent our abstracted understandings of human agency. The combination of an agent-based 95 
conceptual model and the computer code used to specify that conceptual model for simulation 96 
is frequently known as an agent-based model (ABM).  97 
There is not space here, and neither is it our desire, to provide a thorough review of the 98 
literature on ABM (several reviews of which already exist and to which we refer below). 99 
However, it is useful to consider how the potential representational flexibility of ABMs is often 100 
highlighted by invoking a typology that by characterizes them across a spectrum from highly 101 
simplified, data-independent and place-neutral to intricate, data-dependent and place-specific 102 
(e.g. O'Sullivan, 2008, Gilbert, 2008). Models at the simple end of the spectrum, are usually not 103 
intended to represent any specific empirical target but instead are used to demonstrate or 104 
explore some essential or ideal properties of it (Gilbert, 2008). The roots of this approach using 105 
agent-based simulation are in the exploration of complexity theory, emergence and complex 106 
systems adaptive systems (Holland 1995, Miller and Page 2007). A prime example that many 107 
geographers may be familiar with is Thomas Schelling’s model of segregation (Schelling, 108 
1969). Although originally a conceptual model implemented on a draughts board using black 109 
and white draughts, the conceptual model can be readily implemented in computer code as a 110 
formal model for fast iteration with many variations in rules and assumptions (e.g. Grauwin et 111 
al., 2012; Portugali et al., 1997). Schelling wanted to examine how and why racial segregation 112 
in US cities might occur as the result of individuals’ preferences for living in neighbourhoods 113 
with a given proportion of people of the same racial identity. With a highly simplified model he 114 
began to understand how races might become extremely segregated if agents’ tolerances are 115 
biased only slightly towards their own racial identity and even if the population as a whole 116 
prefers some level of racial diversity in their local neighbourhood. Disregarding many potential 117 
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influences on where people might want or are able to live (e.g. wealth, class, aspiration, 118 
mobility), Schelling’s model simply assumed individuals have a sole goal to live in a location 119 
with a specified proportion of neighbours of the same race and that individuals keep moving 120 
until their desired neighbourhood is realized. In other words, it is an emergent property of the 121 
Schelling model that there need not be significant bias in agents’ preferences to produce a 122 
highly segregated pattern of settlement. This interpretation does not close off other possible 123 
interpretations, but does provide the basis for further investigation of the question that would 124 
not have occurred without the development of the model.   125 
In contrast, intricate models aim to be more realistic-looking (e.g. simulating specific 126 
places) or are developed with instrumental or predictive motivations, but even these intricate 127 
models are far from reaching the rich detail of the world. Many examples in geography at this 128 
more detailed end of the spectrum include those that represent the interactions of humans with 129 
their physical environment (e.g. Deadman et al., 2004; Evans and Kelley, 2008). The aim at this 130 
end of the representational spectrum is not necessarily to build on concepts of complexity 131 
theory as above, but to use the flexible representation that ABM affords to represent human-132 
environment interactions. In one prominent example, An et al. (2005) explored how interactions 133 
of household dynamics and energy demands influence panda habitat in the Woolong Nature 134 
Reserve, China, using an ABM that combined remotely sensed satellite data, stated preference 135 
survey data about willingness to pay for new energy sources (i.e. switching to electricity from 136 
fuelwood), and demographic data about household composition and change. Satellite imagery 137 
was used to define the physical environment spatially, stated preference data were used to 138 
define household decisions about energy-source choices, and demographic data were used to 139 
represent changes in household composition through time. Thus, the ABM represented actors at 140 
two organizational levels (individual people and the households they combine to compose), 141 
situating these representations, their simulated decisions (e.g. where to search for fuelwood), 142 
and (changing) compositions within a spatially explicit representation of a heterogeneous forest 143 
landscape (complete with forest-growth model).This representation allowed the authors to 144 
identify counter-intuitive effects of individuals’ decisions about location of fuelwood collection 145 
on panda habitat and enabled understanding of the rôles of socioeconomic and demographic 146 
factors important for conservation policies.  147 
Examples such as this have led to optimistic views about the possibilities of agent-based 148 
simulation for understanding and representing geography. Several reviews and commentaries 149 
have examined how ABM may be useful as a framework for integrating geographical 150 
understanding, touching on several of the points we make here (e.g. Bithell et al., 2008; 151 
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Clifford, 2008; O’Sullivan, 2004, 2008; Wainwright, 2008; Wainwright and Millington, 2010). 152 
Although the view has been optimistic, adoption has been focussed in a few particular areas of 153 
geographical study (Figure 1). Despite interest in some quarters (e.g. studies of land-use 154 
change), many geographers have been cautious about exploring the use of agent-based 155 
simulation for examining more interpretive social, political and cultural questions. These 156 
questions include, for example, how people understand their (social) world, how those 157 
understandings are constrained by their spatial, social and/or environmental contexts, and how 158 
partial understandings may influence social dynamics. The reasons for this reticence are likely 159 
numerous; as Waldherr and Wijermans (2013) have found, criticisms of ABM range from 160 
models being too simple to being too complex and from suffering insufficient theory to 161 
suffering insufficient empirical data (also see Miller and Page 2007 for possible criticisms of 162 
computational approaches). In geography it may also be, on the one hand, because the 163 
distinction between simulation and (statistical, empirical) quantitative approaches has not been 164 
clearly articulated, but nor, on the other hand, has a sufficient counter to criticisms of 165 
simulation’s simplified representation relative to (interpretive, ethnographic) qualitative 166 
approaches. Before moving on to discuss the epistemological complementarities of simulation 167 
to qualitative approaches, we address these points.  168 
 169 
Incomplete Representations 170 
The disaggregated representation of ABM described above can be distinct from the aggregating 171 
and generalizing tendencies of many statistical or analytical models (Epstein 1999; Miller and 172 
Page 2007; but contrast this with developments in microsimulation, e.g. Ballas et al., 2007). 173 
Statistical models, fitted to data that enumerate measured variables, allow general inferences 174 
about populations based on samples. However, these inferences are dependent on what data are, 175 
or can be, collected and subsequently the determination of what the measured variables 176 
represent. Thus in quantitative approaches, data often determine what models can be 177 
investigated and come to dominate the ideas or conceptualizations of how the world is 178 
structured (Sayer 1982). In contrast, because agent-based-simulation frameworks use software 179 
objects with multiple attributes and methods they provide an opportunity to shift the focus from 180 
quantitative generalization to abstracted concepts. This is not to argue that quantitative data and 181 
generalization are not used in ABM (many ABM are strongly data-driven and do use statistical 182 
methods to set their initial conditions and parameterize relationships), nor that there are no 183 
barriers to representing some conceptual models in the computer. Rather, we wish to emphasise 184 
how alternative representations can be produced that start from concepts and not from 185 
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measurements. Such representations help to negotiate criticisms aimed at proponents of 186 
approaches that were advocated during Geography’s Quantitative Revolution (e.g. Harvey 187 
1972) and share more in common with ideas that emerged from complexity theory (Holland 188 
1995). For example, agent-based simulation enables a move beyond considering only 189 
quantitative differences between actors with identical goals (e.g. perfectly economically 190 
rationality) to representing qualitative behavioural differences between actors, not only in terms 191 
of goals (e.g. social justice or environmental sustainability) but also in terms of the need to 192 
balance multiple goals. Actors with qualitatively ‘imperfect’ behaviour that accounts for 193 
individual fallibility (e.g. destructive or error-prone), variation in perspectives (e.g. ‘satisficing’ 194 
rather than optimising; Simon, 1957) and numerous other socially mediated behaviours (e.g. 195 
cooperative, altruistic, imitative) can be represented (e.g. see Macy and Willer 2002). Agents 196 
need not necessarily correspond to individual humans and within the same simulation the 197 
behaviours and interactions between collectives such as families, households, firms or other 198 
institutions can be represented (e.g. as used by An et al. 2005). 199 
To continue to build on Sayer (1992), ABMs are abstract in the sense that they are 200 
‘distinct from generalizations’; they can be representations of autonomous individuated objects 201 
with causal power. Now, it is clear that simulation modellers’ abstractions in this sense 202 
(whether ABM or otherwise) are ‘thinner’ than many other qualitative approaches (e.g. 203 
ethnographic) in geography that often aim to produce ‘thicker’, richer descriptions of empirical 204 
events and relationships. Simulation models are simplified and incomplete representations of 205 
the world, and are thin in the sense that the characteristics and attributes of their abstracted 206 
objects do not account for all possible corresponding characteristics and attributes in the real 207 
world, nor all possible interactions, reactions and changes2. ABM lack much of the detail that 208 
makes understanding their targets so difficult in the real (social) world through more traditional 209 
qualitative, interpretive approaches. But the difference in detail and completeness between 210 
ABM and representations that an intensive qualitative study might produce is in degree rather 211 
than in kind; epistemologically modellers’ abstractions can still be useful because simulated 212 
representation of interactions between abstracted objects can produce their own contextual 213 
circumstances. For example, in Schelling’s model the movement of agents changes the racial 214 
composition of other agents’ neighbourhoods (possibly causing them to move), and in the 215 
Chinese human-environment model agents modify the environment spatially with subsequent 216 
                                                             
2 Using this definition, quantitative/statistical approaches would also be ‘thin’. However, our thick-thin distinction 
here is specifically aimed at representation of behaviours in heterogeneous circumstances, which many quantitative 
approaches are not so well-suited to examine because of their aggregating tendencies. 
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effects on other agents (e.g. they have to walk further to harvest firewood). From a realist 217 
perspective (Sayer 1992), such abstractions are vital for scientific understanding and useful for 218 
improving understanding about objects and their relations (i.e. structures) which, when 219 
activated as mechanisms in particular circumstances, produce observable events. Thus in this 220 
realist sense, abstractions implemented in an agent-based simulation can be useful to explore 221 
the implications of (social) structures for when and where events will occur, which events are 222 
necessary consequences of the structures of objects or their relationships, and which events are 223 
contingent on circumstances (as discussed in an example below). As long as the model can be 224 
defended as a representation of the real world of social interaction, this approach allows 225 
“thicker” understandings about the emergence or production of behaviours and patterns from 226 
simulated individuated objects and their relationships that are not different in kind from the way 227 
ethnographic thick descriptions of many individual behaviours promotes understanding of 228 
culture through written representation of a conceptual model.  229 
Some uses of ABM do make it difficult to see how these thicker understandings might 230 
emerge. For example, recently Epstein (2013) has produced a series of models based on the 231 
Rescorla-Wagner model of conditioning (associative learning). His simple “Agent_Zero” can 232 
apparently produce a set of behaviours interpreted as corresponding to retaliatory behaviours in 233 
conflict, capital flight in economic crises or even the rôle of social media in the Arab Spring of 234 
2011. Although Epstein presents these examples as “parables” or “fables” rather than as strict 235 
explanations, the argument that all these examples can be explained through basic Pavlovian 236 
conditioning does seem to close off further, thicker explanation. We would argue that, although 237 
thin, Schelling’s model offers better opportunities for thicker understanding to later emerge; 238 
while it will never be an accurate representation of real world urban segregation it does show 239 
what sorts of local interactions and behaviours are needed to explain the more general pattern, 240 
and from which more contextual understanding can come. By making clear abstractions to 241 
represent specific social structures Schelling’s model enables us to begin to learn more about 242 
the necessities and contingencies of a particular phenomenon in question which in turn can lead 243 
to thicker explanation. The abstractions in Epstein’s Agent Zero are more ambiguous; the 244 
model’s representation of individual but universal psychology seems to make thicker 245 
understanding difficult because it poorly differentiates what is socially (structurally) important3.  246 
To those negotiating the difficulties of understanding empirical social and cultural 247 
phenomena this line may be too thin to tread, and all ABM may seem too abstract (in the sense 248 
                                                             
3 To use Sayer’s (1992) terminology, the abstractions seem contentless 
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of ‘removed from reality’) and uncoupled from substantive experience of the world to be 249 
relevant. Those preferring ‘concrete’, empirical approaches that deliberately explore the 250 
importance and meaning of contextual details may see little value in simulation approaches that 251 
require clear abstractions. We do not mean to criticise such a preference, but to argue that, 252 
preferences aside, any aversion to simulation should not be because the representation it 253 
provides is fundamentally different from representations based on empirical observations of 254 
activities (it is not). For example, some have argued that the incompleteness of the 255 
representations that simulation models offer will never allow us to distinguish contingent 256 
consequences (whether events in time or spatial patterns) from necessary ones:  257 
 258 
 As for computer simulations, they are impoverished models of reality, several 259 
orders of magnitude less complex than reality itself (Clifford, 2008; Parker, 2008). 260 
Since contingency is about changes in tiny little details, and since simulations leave 261 
most of the world outside their compass, one cannot tell apart a contingent 262 
eventuation from a necessary one from simulating history alone. More technically, 263 
and following Pollock's logic of defeasible reasoning (Pollock, 2008), any verdict of 264 
any computer simulation can always be undermined with the undercutting defeater 265 
that what it left outside would have been crucial in the respective chains of 266 
causation, and hence, in its final output.” 267 
 (Simandan, 2010: 394) 268 
 269 
This passage highlights, we think, misconceptions about what simulation modelling is for and 270 
what it can ultimately achieve. Modellers are usually well-aware that their creations are 271 
incomplete representations of the world. For example, the issue of ‘model closure’ – the need to 272 
place boundaries on real-world ‘open’ systems so that they can be conceptually ‘closed’ for 273 
analysis – has been well discussed in geography (e.g. Brown, 2004, Lane, 2001). Simandan’s 274 
(2010) argument (via Pollock) is ultimately (epistemologically) correct and simulations can 275 
always be undercut by criticisms of being incomplete representations. However, as the passage 276 
above implies, taking the logic of defeasible reasoning to its (logical) extreme, neither can any 277 
other way of representing observed events. Indeed, as Gödel’s theorem proves, it is not possible 278 
to use a system of logic to demonstrate that all logical components of that system are true or 279 
false (Gödel, 1931, Meltzer, 1962). In other words, it is not possible to use a system of logic to 280 
demonstrate that all logical components of that system are true or false (even if some of them 281 
may be). Tarski extended this idea into a general theory of truth (Hodges, 2013). Thus, other 282 
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interpretative and qualitative approaches to representing geography may provide thick, rich 283 
descriptions of the world, but even the most detailed may have left out something important for 284 
understanding events (or for creating justified meaning).  285 
The recognition of (all) models as being incomplete, leads to the identification of 286 
models as being more or less useful (Box, 1979) or reliable (Winsberg, 2010) for understanding 287 
the world. Whether a model is useful or reliable depends on how it is constructed and used. 288 
Although quantitative generalization is not necessary, (agent-based) simulation does demand 289 
some kind of logical symbolization to convert information or natural language models 290 
(including conceptual models) into a formal model encoded in a computer programming 291 
language (which is subsequently executed to provide an inference; Edmonds, 2001). The 292 
choices made about how this is done, about what concepts, entities or relationships are 293 
represented, how they are coded, analysed and interpreted – and together which constitute the 294 
practice of modelling – must of course be argued and justified. Use of agent-based simulation 295 
to date has generally emphasised the representation of individual actors and their interaction (a 296 
legacy of roots in complexity theory), but examples of representing collectives do exist (as 297 
discussed below) and an emphasis on agent-interaction is not needed (although the importance 298 
of interactions is sometimes taken as an indicator that an agent-based approach is valuable; 299 
O’Sullivan et al. 2012).  300 
There are numerous examples of modellers trying to make transparent the potential 301 
black box of their simulated computer representations and how they were produced (e.g. 302 
Grimm et al., 2006, 2010; Müller et al., 2014; Schmolke et al., 2010), despite the tendency for 303 
publication practice to hide these steps in the final article4. Furthermore, transparency to enable 304 
evaluation of conceptual models and their implied consequences is important beyond computer 305 
simulation; qualitative research frameworks (such as grounded theory) require theory, data, and 306 
the research process linking one to the other be clearly reported to allow appropriate evaluation 307 
of findings (Bailey et al. 1999). Despite differences in detail and approach – differences in the 308 
thickness of representation – we see no fundamental reason to more or less trust geographical 309 
representations based on interpretive understandings written in ordinary language than 310 
conceptual models written in computer code and executed to explore their potential 311 
implications (as in simulation). All models are incomplete, and although simulation models 312 
                                                             
4 Unfortunately, current publishing conventions prevent the this aspect of modelling practice – exploring and 
interpreting different model implementations and their outputs on the way to producing some ‘final’ understanding 
– but means of documenting such a process have been proposed (in environmental modelling, Schmolke et al. 
2010). 
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themselves may be thinner (fewer details, less context) than other approaches, there are deeper 313 
epistemological benefits for geographers as we now discuss. 314 
 315 
Understanding geography through agent-based modelling 316 
As highlighted above, original uses of agent-based simulation were rooted in complexity theory 317 
and concepts such as emergence, thresholds and feedbacks (Holland 1995, Miller and Page 318 
2007; Portugali, 2006). After Schelling’s early (pre-complexity) model of racial segregation – 319 
showing how thresholds in preferences of individual agents can produce ‘emergent’ patterns at 320 
a higher level – later work more rigorously examined complex systems dynamics using ABM. 321 
Epstein and Axtell’s ‘sugarscape’, presented in a book entitled Growing Artificial Societies 322 
(Epstein and Axtell 1996), provides possibly the archetypal example of the computational 323 
exploration of how simple rules of interaction between individuated agents can produce 324 
emergent patterns and behaviour at higher levels of organisation. Epstein has coined the term 325 
‘generative’ to describe the use of simulation models that represent interactions between 326 
individual objects (agents) to generate emergent patterns, thereby explaining those patterns 327 
from the bottom up (Epstein 1999). Taking this further, a proposed Generative Social Science 328 
(Epstein 2007) uses generative simulation to attempt to understand the mechanisms that 329 
produce emergent social patterns. The bottom-up approach, espousing use of ABM to explore 330 
concepts in complexity and essential system properties, is a perspective that may not chime 331 
well with many human geographers whose interest is the importance of social structures and 332 
phenomena for understanding the world (O’Sullivan 2004). But while the roots of ABM are in 333 
complexity theory and the desire to explain from the bottom-up, and although there are still 334 
epistemological benefits for using ABM in this generative mode, future use of ABM for 335 
understanding in human geography need not be framed that way.  336 
The various epistemological rôles of ABMs and the practice of their development and 337 
use (i.e. agent-based modelling) have been discussed elsewhere by authors in numerous 338 
disciplines. Many reasons have been suggested for carrying out simulation modelling (e.g. 339 
Epstein, 2008, van der Leeuw, 2004). The epistemological rôles of agent-based models and 340 
modelling we wish to emphasize here can be broadly defined as heuristic and dialogic and echo 341 
previous suggestions (O’Sullivan 2004). Agent-based modelling is heuristic in that it provides a 342 
means to better understand the world via abstraction, not make predictions about it via 343 
(statistical) generalization. Agent-based modelling can be dialogic in that it can be used to open 344 
up debate about how the world should or could be, not simply describing and understanding its 345 
current state. Ultimately, the value of these ways of using ABM may only be properly realised 346 
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by mixing the advantages of simulation with other approaches in geography in new mixed 347 
methods, but before addressing that point we outline our view of the heuristic and dialogic roles 348 
in geography.  349 
 350 
Heuristic rôles 351 
The first heuristic use of ABM as a tool to think with, builds on the generative approach 352 
outlined above to assist the identification of (social) structures and interactions that generate 353 
observed patterns and changes. In the ‘generative mode’ of using ABM, multiple alternative 354 
premises (theories, hypotheses) can be represented by multiple different model implementations 355 
which are then examined to investigate what structures, powers or relationships are necessary to 356 
produce observed empirical patterns or events. However, rather than being content with the idea 357 
that all we need do to explain social phenomena is represent the interactions of individuals, 358 
ABM could be used in geography to move beyond the individualist perspective and evaluate 359 
the importance of structure versus agency in social phenomena. The recursive nature of social 360 
phenomena (Giddens, 1984), in which individuals’ agency and social structures reciprocally 361 
reproduce one another, is a topic that agent-based simulation models are particularly well suited 362 
for investigating. Over a decade ago O’Sullivan and Haklay (2000) highlighted that an 363 
individualist bias already existed in the use of ABMs, in part stemming from ideas of 364 
complexity and the goal of generating emergent patterns from the bottom up, out of simple 365 
rules of agent interactions. Despite early calls to avoid an infatuation for emergence (e.g. 366 
Halpin, 1998) and the more metaphorical elements of complexity theory (Thrift, 1999), since 367 
the turn of the 21st century the bottom-up approach has prevailed in agent-based simulation. 368 
Although the one-way, bottom-up approach provides a useful means to understand how patterns 369 
are generated, it need not be the only means to understand complex processes. Two-way 370 
approaches that examine the recursive interactions of individuated objects and the structures 371 
and patterns they produce should be equally fruitful. Research beyond geography has already 372 
pursued this recursive approach to use ABMs for investigating behavioural norms (e.g. 373 
Hollander and Wu, 2011) and deviations from them (e.g. Agar, 2003). Much of this research is 374 
being conducted by researchers in computer science and artificial intelligence, detached from 375 
social theory and understandings of how individuals reproduce, for example, institutions or 376 
cultural groupings. There is scope here for geographers to contribute, not only by way of their 377 
perspectives on the functioning of society but also by way of the importance of space on the 378 
duality of structure (and agency).   379 
 Page 12 of 30 
More recently, DeLanda (2002, 2006, 2011) has developed a realist perspective on 380 
simulation based on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze that may help to move beyond the 381 
bottom-up bias and provide a means of using ABM in ‘thicker’ ways. DeLanda argues that a 382 
Deleuzian assemblage approach can be used to interpret the ways its elements interact 383 
differently in different contexts. For example, context-dependent behaviour of agents in an 384 
ABM allows a representation of how elements of an assemblage might behave differently in 385 
different settings, thereby overcoming issues of linear causality and micro- or macro-386 
reductionism that are inherent in essentialist interpretations of realism (DeLanda, 2006). For 387 
example, consider the well-known ABM study of Long House Valley in Arizona (Axtell et al., 388 
2002) which used multiple simulations of households, environment and food supplies to better 389 
understand the population growth and collapse of the Kayenta Anasazi. The multiple 390 
simulations could be considered as bounded (territorialized) assemblages of contingencies that 391 
may have occurred in 15th Century CE Arizona. Comparing these possible assemblages with 392 
archaeological assemblages (in both senses) provides us a means of interpreting possible and 393 
necessary conditions for the development and collapse of settlement here. From these 394 
perspectives, we might consider ABMs as not so much hyperreal (sensu Baudrillard, 1983) in 395 
which simulation is used to replace lived experience, but hyporeal, where the generative 396 
approach of ABM is used to emphasize the underpinning mechanisms of explanation. Those 397 
underpinning mechanisms highlight the importance of contingency in the emergence of specific 398 
forms of assemblage not individuals (DeLanda, 2006). Furthermore, the concept of assemblage 399 
can be used to understand the overall practice of modelling. As discussed above, the decisions 400 
of what to put into and leave out of a model can be highly individual (e.g. Cross and 401 
Moscardini, 1985, suggest modelling is as much an art as a science) and different styles of 402 
programming can be very personal (e.g. Turkle, 1984), even if they produce similar end results. 403 
The outputs of simulation can be considered the artefacts of the assemblage – some specifically 404 
sought, others selected from a much larger collection – used to build narratives that work 405 
towards explanation.   406 
 A second heuristic use of computational approaches like agent-based simulation 407 
(beyond ‘generative’) is in what we might term the ‘consequential’ mode; the ability to explore 408 
the multiple possible outcomes implied by the premises of a single conceptual model. The 409 
disaggregated representation and potential use of conditional statements and rules that operate 410 
in dynamic contexts during a simulation means that ABMs allow the investigation of what will 411 
always happen, what may possibly happen, and will likely never happen in different conditions. 412 
For instance, Millington et al. (2014) took a generative approach to examine the importance of 413 
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geography for access to the state school system in the UK. The ABM represents ‘school’ and 414 
‘parent’ agents, with parents’ aspiration to send their child to the best school (as defined by 415 
examination results) represented as the primary motivation of parent agents. The location and 416 
movement of parent agents within the modelled environment is also constrained by their level 417 
of aspiration5. Using the model Millington et al. (2014) found that although constraints on 418 
parental mobility always produced the same general pattern of performance across all schools 419 
(i.e. a necessary outcome), the performance of an individual school varied between simulations 420 
depending on initial conditions (i.e. a contingent outcome). These types of analyses are possible 421 
because ABMs provide the means to ‘replay the tape’ of the simulated system multiple times, 422 
enabling the production of a probabilistic or general account of systems behaviours and 423 
tendencies (O’Sullivan et al., 2012). Multiple simulations provide the means to assess the 424 
frequency of the conditions that arise and which lead to certain events (e.g. the frequencies of 425 
contexts in which agents make their decisions).  426 
However, such statistical (nomothetic) portraits of system-level generalizations merely 427 
touch the surface of the dynamics represented by agent-based approaches. The disaggregated 428 
representational framework of ABMs adds further value for understanding by allowing 429 
idiographic descriptions and, importantly, explanations (via interpretation) of sequences of 430 
simulated events and interactions. Hence, ABMs could be considered as being fundamentally 431 
event-driven (e.g. Weiss, 2013); heterogeneous interactions between potentially unique 432 
elements produce context-dependent and unique events that change the state of the simulated 433 
world, setting the context for other interactions (events) in time and space. From this 434 
idiographic perspective, the examination of recorded events from multiple simulations allows 435 
an exploration of the combinations of necessary and contingent interactions that produced 436 
patterns (see Millington et al., 2012). It is not only the search for when simulated events 437 
produce patterns observed in the real world that should be of interest; identifying when we do 438 
not see expected events and patterns can be equally enlightening. In the same way as alternative 439 
or counter-factual historical analysis may shed light on the reasons for what actually happened 440 
(e.g. what if Nazi Germany had won the Second World War: Warf, 2002), ABMs can be useful 441 
for identifying what is plausible and realistic but which is unlikely to happen. Looking forward, 442 
ABM could be better used for exploring social structures and relations and how they might 443 
change in future. For example, in the reflections and conclusions of their edited volume on 444 
Agent-Based Models of Geographical Systems, Heppenstall et al. (2012: 744) argue that agent-445 
                                                             
5 To view and experiment with this model visit: http://modelingcommons.org/browse/one_model/3827 
 Page 14 of 30 
based simulation models can address pieces of many contemporary ‘grand challenges’ faced 446 
globally (e.g. aging and demography, urbanization and migration, climate change, poverty 447 
security and conflict, etc.) by focusing on behavioural change. These behavioural changes could 448 
be abrupt rather than gradual and based on novel ideas, causal powers and social structures not 449 
previously seen. The use of techniques that make generalizations of quantitative data (no matter 450 
how ‘big’) about past behaviour or social activity is of little use in this situation, first because 451 
the same causal powers and relationships operating in different (future) contexts will produce 452 
different outcomes, and second because causal powers and relationships may change in future. 453 
In contrast, ABM representing abstractions of human cognition and social relationships could 454 
be used to understand better how the context in which they operate leads to alternative 455 
consequences. 456 
 457 
Dialogic rôles 458 
Beyond (and allied to) these heuristic benefits, a strength of computer simulation is that the 459 
representation of a conceptualization or theory must be logically consistent and that once coded 460 
in a computer language it is a formal expression of that conceptualization or theory. Whether 461 
the process of developing a simulation model is useful or reliable depends on whether the 462 
enterprise is sanctioned by the user (whomever that is), in just the same way as the publication 463 
of this paper is sanctioned (by the reviewers/editor). It is an ordeal for us to order our thoughts 464 
into a coherent (we hope!) argument in this paper, but once it is set down in print it is there to 465 
be thought about, critiqued, debated and ultimately sanctioned as a worthwhile (or otherwise) 466 
contribution to knowledge or understanding. The same is true of computer-simulation 467 
modelling; once a conceptualization is written down in code, executed in the computer, the data 468 
or output produced, interpreted and presented (in print and elsewhere) it is ready to be thought 469 
about, critiqued, debated and ultimately sanctioned as a worthwhile (or otherwise) contribution 470 
to knowledge or understanding. The choice of what is presented and how it is presented may be 471 
highly individual. For example, Turkle (2009) discusses the example of a protein 472 
crystallographer who deliberately degrades the outputs of simulations to avoid audiences at 473 
conferences from over-interpreting the precision of the results. The contribution to knowledge 474 
or understanding is part of the dialogic rôle of agent-based simulation modelling; by “putting 475 
your model where your mouth is” (Bedau, 2009) and presenting your conceptual understanding 476 
as a formal model allows others to clearly see your understanding of the structure of the world, 477 
investigate its implications (via simulation), discuss and interpret it. This is a useful aspect of 478 
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critical reflection that modellers can build on to engage with non-modellers in participatory 479 
forms of modelling.   480 
Accompanying the participatory turn in geography (Chilvers, 2009) modellers have 481 
begun to move in this direction to explore environmental knowledge controversies (Landström 482 
et al., 2011, Lane et al., 2011; Carabine et al., 2014). Lane et al. (2011) and Landström et al. 483 
(2011) showed how knowledge can be created from computer-simulation models and modelling 484 
through discussion and constructive argument, examining how different actors perceived 485 
physical environmental phenomena in different ways. Their research engaged the local 486 
community in Ryedale, UK, to create a research group for the co-production of knowledge for 487 
flood-risk management. Initially the modellers had expected to use an existing hydrological 488 
model to explore flood-risk issues. However, early discussion in workshops about the model 489 
and its structure revealed that members of the local community were unhappy with the 490 
representation of upstream water-storage processes. By confronting the modellers’ 491 
understanding with their own, participatory research-group members negotiated the legitimacy 492 
of the modelling and began to contribute to the actual construction of the computational model 493 
(via the assumptions it represented). Although this particular modelling example did not use 494 
ABM, it demonstrates how presenting geographical understanding and theory in a formal 495 
(simulation) model allowed participants to negotiate the creation of new knowledge and open 496 
up debate about alternative futures, how they are arrived at and which are preferable. Although 497 
promising, the adoption of participatory ABM approaches has been slow (e.g. for land use 498 
studies; O’Sullivan et al. 2015), but examples do exist of use for engaging local planners in a 499 
continuous dialogue through model development (Zellner, 2008) and to challenge stakeholders’ 500 
assumptions about planning policies and the impact of regulations (Zellner et al., 2012).  501 
A similar approach utilizing an agent-based perspective is exemplified by the 502 
companion modelling approach of the CIRAD research group (Barreteau, 2003). This approach 503 
uses high levels of participation by non-modellers in the development and use of ABMs for 504 
investigating natural resource management issues. Rôle-playing games are used to identify 505 
appropriate model structures (e.g. Barreteau et al., 2001, Castella et al., 2005); actors in the 506 
game correspond to agents represented in the simulation and the rules of the game are translated 507 
into the simulation-model code to represent real-world interactions and decision-making. Hence 508 
the rôle-playing game and simulation model are complementary and their development is 509 
iterative as stakeholders and modellers learn about (their) actions and interactions. For example, 510 
Souchère et al. (2010) used a combined approach to facilitate negotiations on the future 511 
management of soil erosion in France. Local farmers, government officials and scientific 512 
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advisors participated in a combined rôle-playing, agent-based simulation to explore the 513 
consequences of five scenarios in hypothetical agricultural watershed, finding that by 514 
negotiating and co-ordinating land-use actions they could reduce environmental degradation. In 515 
this manner, agent-based simulation modelling can act as a mediating object between 516 
stakeholders, providing an extra channel for interaction which can be administered with agreed 517 
procedures, facilitating communication and negotiation of a common understanding of the 518 
issues at stake (e.g. Zellner, 2008). For instance, epistemic barriers may exist between 519 
agricultural stakeholders because some results of actions are directly observable (like weed-free 520 
rows of crops) but others are not (such as decreases in rates of soil and nutrient loss, as Carolan, 521 
2006 discusses). Simulation approaches could assist all parties to understand in this context, 522 
breaking down epistemic barriers, by providing a common framework that helps to illustrate the 523 
likely results of dynamic processes and feedbacks that are not immediately observable on the 524 
ground. Of course, use of simulation is not the only means to negotiate understanding between 525 
various stakeholders, and if stakeholder participation is not embedded within the practice of 526 
model development itself, there may be barriers to identifying what insights simulation can 527 
bring (e.g. Millington et al., 2011).  528 
 529 
Mixed qualitative-simulation methods 530 
In The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (Adams, 1979), the supercomputer Deep Thought 531 
computes The Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, The Universe, and Everything to be 42; 532 
a seemingly meaningless answer produced by a seemingly untrustworthy computer. It turns out 533 
that the answer is incomprehensible because those asking the question did not know what they 534 
were asking, nor had they done the hard work of trying to find the meaning for themselves. 535 
There are parallels here, we feel, for agent-based simulation modelling. Advances in computing 536 
have provided flexible ways of representing spatio-temporal variation and change in the world, 537 
but this new power should (does) not mean that we are relieved of work and that answers will 538 
simply present themselves in the piles of numbers produced. The goal is not piles of numbers 539 
(let alone a single number!), but improved understanding via multiple facets of the simulation-540 
modelling process (Winsberg, 2010). Although (multiple) general patterns may be predicted by 541 
simulation models, accurate point-predictions of specific empirical events produced in complex 542 
systems of mind and society are likely impossible (Hayek, 1974). The Deep Thought allegory 543 
highlights that the most important issue when working with computer-simulation tools for 544 
understanding geographical systems is not about getting definitive answers, but about asking 545 
the right questions. Acknowledging that modellers may not be the right people to identify the 546 
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right questions is an important driver of the dialogic approach to modelling. But furthermore 547 
the allegory highlights the problems of ignoring the process of gaining knowledge through 548 
simulation modelling, the practice of working back and forth between theory and data 549 
(observations) to update or create theory, identify new data needs and improve understanding. 550 
Although modellers have developed ways for themselves to maintain standards in their 551 
modelling practice (e.g. through protocols such as ODD; Grimm et al. 2006), ensuring 552 
appropriate questions, representations and evaluations of simulation output would benefit from 553 
increased collaboration with researchers taking different approaches to understand the world. 554 
Furthermore, the epistemological roles of modelling we outlined above will likely only reach 555 
full potential for researchers not using simulation if there is engagement throughout the 556 
modelling process. Consequently, in the remainder of the paper we suggest how new forms of 557 
mixed methods – qualitative-simulation mixed methods that iterate back-and-forth between 558 
‘thick’ (qualitative) and ‘thin’ (simulation) approaches and between the theory and data they 559 
produce or suggest – might enable synergies within geography. Importantly, these mixed 560 
methods are based on the notion of simulation modelling as a process; a way of using 561 
computers with concepts and data to ensure social theory remains embedded in the practice of 562 
day-to-day geographical thinking. 563 
Across the social sciences generally, previous mixed methods have focused on the use 564 
of quantitative and qualitative approaches (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). To consider how 565 
mixed qualitative-simulation approaches might proceed in geography we first reflect on the five 566 
categories of mixed quantitative-qualitative approaches discussed by Greene et al. (1989): 567 
triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation and expansion (Table I). Triangulation 568 
through mixed qualitative-simulation research would mean corroboration of appropriately 569 
identified structures and relationships and their contingent or necessary consequences. 570 
Complementary use of the approaches for analysis would allow, for example, richer 571 
(qualitative) or longer (simulation) illustrations of dynamics compared to the other. 572 
Development of theory, understanding and data can be achieved through qualitative and 573 
simulation approaches by continued iterative use of both, building on the different 574 
epistemological rôles of ABM outlined above. This development also has the potential to 575 
initiate questions and new research directions for example by revealing unexpected results. 576 
Finally, expansion of inquiry through mixed qualitative-simulation methods could be achieved 577 
by extrapolating methods across scales (simulation) or transferring general understanding to 578 
new subject areas (qualitative; but also vice versa). Simulation approaches may emphasise 579 
simple questions which provide focus to direct qualitative accounts or analyses (Gomm and 580 
 Page 18 of 30 
Hammersley, 2001), data collection (Cheong et al., 2012) and theory building (Tubaro and 581 
Casilli, 2010). In turn, understanding gained from thicker interpretive approaches and analyses 582 
should be able to help simulation modellers to ask the right questions and refine their thinner 583 
representations of behaviours, structures and relationships. Both may identify new questions for 584 
the other6.  585 
Similar iterative approaches between qualitative and simulation methods have recently 586 
been proposed in sociology (Tubaro and Casilli, 2010, Chattoe-Brown, 2013). Geography has 587 
yet to substantially engage with mixed qualitative-simulation methods, but has a strong 588 
foundation in other forms of mixed methods on which it can draw, both regarding its practice 589 
and epistemology (e.g. Phillip 1998, Elwood 2010). A primary area of work on which mixed 590 
qualitative-simulation methods in geography can build is Qualitative GIS (e.g. Pavlovskaya 591 
2006, Cope and Elwood 2009). Qualitative GIS has developed after initial criticism about the 592 
productive role GIS could play for furthering human geography because of a lack of reflection 593 
on the epistemological implications of the technical approach and its perceived service to 594 
corporations over the disenfranchised (Schuurman 2006). More recently, the criticism has 595 
turned positive as human geographers have developed approaches using GIS mixed with other 596 
methods to produce valuable insights and understanding that would not otherwise have been 597 
possible. A prime example is the approach of grounded visualisation (Knigge and Cope 2006), 598 
an iterative process of data collection, display, analysis and critical reflection which combines 599 
grounded theory with visualization (based on quantitative GIS) to find meaning and build 600 
knowledge. A similar iterative approach taking the outline from above might be developed to 601 
produce a kind of ‘grounded simulation modelling’ which ensures that conceptual models 602 
encoded formally for simulation are held accountable to empirical data that reflect everyday 603 
experiences and actions of individuals and groups. Grounding in this sense is a form of model 604 
confrontation (e.g. Hilborn and Mangel 1997) and demands an iterative approach to examining 605 
and comparing theories (i.e. model structures) through exploration of data. As an iterative 606 
approach this would mean not only grounding the modelling during conceptualization stages of 607 
the process, but also in later analysis and reflection leading to modifications in model structure. 608 
One way to ensure this reflection is by building it into the practice of modelling, making visible 609 
all the decisions and interpretations made at various points throughout the practice of 610 
modelling. Although, as we highlighted above, efforts to ensure such transparency are being 611 
                                                             
6 Although our focus here is on the synergy of qualitative and simulation approaches, the approach is pragmatically 
motivated such that quantitative approaches could also be part of the mix (so long as vigilance over 
conceptualization is maintained). 
 Page 19 of 30 
advanced, these have been based in other disciplines (e.g. ecology; Schmolke et al. 2010) and 612 
the practice of modelling in geography could be better revealed by building on such efforts to 613 
make modelling transparent. This means for example, moving beyond a static presentation of 614 
the final model to describing the modelling process but also reflecting on and analysing the 615 
nature of the subjectivities in the process, the inherent assumptions and positionalities of 616 
decisions that were made. Such reflection seldom is presented for others to see such is the 617 
negative heuristic of modern peer-review publication, diverting modellers from discussing 618 
those elements of their practice that they may be well aware of (e.g. Turkle, 2009) but which 619 
would make it difficult for their manuscript to be published were they too open about them. 620 
Mixed methods in geography often challenge the separation of distinct epistemologies 621 
and partiality of knowledge (e.g. Elwood 2010) and if qualitative-simulation mix methods are 622 
to be iterative they will draw on different aspects of the epistemological attributes of ABM at 623 
different points in the research process. For example, taking the school-access modelling 624 
example used above, whereas Millington et al. (2014) were content to use a generative 625 
approach to compare model output to spatial patterns of access (i.e. distance from home to 626 
school), a next step in empirical grounding might mean returning to the field to examine how 627 
representations of parents’ experiences of success or failure in the simulation corresponds to the 628 
individuals lived experience of these, or how their own interpretation of the model influences 629 
their personal understanding of the system. This later stage in the modelling might then shift 630 
from building on the generative possibilities of ABM to the dialogic. Furthermore, each of the 631 
modes (generative, consequential, dialogic) outlined above implies a different perspective on 632 
how important it is to identify a universally ‘accepted’ representation of the world (resonating 633 
with issues of the ‘fixity’ of code space in GIS; Schuurman 2006). In the generative mode of 634 
simulation the search is for possible structures of the world for explaining observations. 635 
Depending on what grounded observations we wish to relate to (but also dependent on who is 636 
making the relating), different model structures will be more or less useful for reproducing 637 
observations and therefore producing understanding. A dialogic approach need not 638 
acknowledge any single model as being the ‘right one’ (i.e. fixed) but can offer up alternatives, 639 
explore understandings of others’ (conceptual) models, and/or debate the desirability of 640 
different (social) structures. In contrast, the consequential mode demands that a single model is 641 
considered valid (i.e. fixed), at least temporarily, while its consequences are explored. It may be 642 
that the consequences of alternative models are investigated, but each model structure being 643 
examined must be accepted if the consequences are to be trusted and found useful for 644 
understanding how simulated events might play out.   645 
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Thus, at various points through the process of modelling we will either need to doubt or 646 
trust these thin representations of the world. On examining how simulations are used practically 647 
in design and science, Turkle (2009) discusses how the use of simulation demands immersion 648 
and the difficulty practitioners of simulation face to both do and doubt simultaneously when 649 
immersed. That is, immersion in a simulation demands suspension of doubt. Simulation 650 
modelling in geography is useful to the extent that we trust a model as a closed representation 651 
of an open system (as discussed above), but 'the price of the employment of models is eternal 652 
vigilance' (Braithwaite, 1953). Braithwaite’s discussion pre-dates simulation and, to reiterate 653 
our discussion above, the same argument about trust could be levelled at any model framework 654 
in geography, and even the thickest interpretative model will be incomplete. In a mixed 655 
qualitative-simulation approach, working across the different epistemological modes and using 656 
empirical data to ground the investigation, issues of trust and doubt in the representations in the 657 
computer will likely be raised but hopefully also eased through better understanding of the 658 
underlying representation (i.e. conceptual models). This is currently a hope, both because 659 
geographers have yet to properly engage with such mixed qualitative-simulation methods but 660 
also because engagement between researchers with different epistemological perspectives can 661 
be both risky (Demeritt, 2009) and intellectually uncomfortable (Chattoe-Brown, 2013). One of 662 
the most difficult aspects of this approach may be finding ways of suspending doubt for long 663 
enough to explore consequences of others’ conceptions, but while remaining sufficiently 664 
critical to question outcomes. 665 
Before any new cohort of researchers with this interactional expertise (sensu Collins and 666 
Evans 2002) between qualitative and simulation methods emerges, there will be interaction 667 
costs. Such costs are unavoidable but if research capability is about relations and relational 668 
thinking (Le Heron et al., 2011), additive value is gained as conceptual modes of thinking are 669 
bridged. Common themes on which these bridges can be founded have been provided above, 670 
through the heuristic and dialogic rôles we have argued ABM can play in understanding and 671 
representing geography. Projects that aim to identify how ABM can be used in generative, 672 
consequential and dialogic modes for furthering social, political and cultural geography might 673 
be pursued to address a variety of questions. How can geographers use ABM to help reveal the 674 
rôle of social context in generating observed patterns of activity (such as the reproduction of 675 
inequality or flows of consumption)? Given current understandings of trajectories of political, 676 
economic and cultural change, how might geographers use agent-based simulation as a means 677 
to confront expectations by suggesting alternative futures, due to changes in social structures 678 
and/or behaviour of individuals not previously seen? In participatory research settings, what are 679 
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the opportunities and challenges for ABM to help individuals and groups to understand the 680 
impact of their local agency and on dynamics and change of broader social systems and 681 
structures? Furthermore, if agency is considered more collectively, arising from the process of 682 
participatory modelling (as in projects like the Ryedale flood-modelling example above), what 683 
would that mean for the nature of the heuristic and dialogic ideas presented above? 684 
Alternatively, how might new-found understandings by individuals about their agency be 685 
turned back to geographers to understand the rôle of agent-based simulation modelling itself as 686 
an agent of social change? We offer these questions to inspire new projects that iterate through 687 
qualitative and simulation approaches in a recursive way.  Importantly, this exploration should 688 
see the process of (agent-based) simulation modelling as a practice, an assemblage of ideas, 689 
experiences, results and narratives; a way of fostering geographical understanding through thick 690 
and thin representation.  691 
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Table I. Comparison of alternative mixed method approaches 911 
Mixed Qualitative-Quantitative*  Implications for Mixed Qualitative-Simulation 
Triangulation of results; convergence, 
corroboration, correspondence between 
methods. 
Triangulation of results; e.g. corroboration of 
structures and relationships to identify likely 
processes. 
Complementarity of results; elaboration, 
enhancement, illustration, clarification 
between methods. 
Complementarity of results; e.g. common or 
alternative interpretation of outputs, results 
and analysis between methods 
Development of results and data; inform 
sampling, implementation, measurement 
decisions between methods. 
Development of results and data; via 
continued iterative use of both approaches for 
theory and understanding.  
Initiation of questions; discovery of 
contradiction, new perspectives, recasting 
questions  
Initiation of questions and new research 
directions; e.g. through unique observations or 
unexpected results 
Expansion of inquiry; extend breadth and 
range using different methods. 
Expansion of inquiry; e.g. across scales or 
subject areas 
*From Greene et al. (1989) 912 
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Figures 915 
 916 
Figure 1. Frequency of papers on agent-based modelling in geography journals. Papers are 917 
concentrated in few technically oriented and North American journals, with many journals having no 918 
papers using ABM (shown in the box). Results are from the following search term when searching 919 
‘Topic’ on the ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports (2013 Social Science Edition) subject 920 
category Geography: “agent based” AND model* (on 13 December 2014).  921 
